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PUNISHING BAD BROKERS:
SELF-REGULATION AND FINRA SANCTIONS
Barbara Black *
INTRODUCTION
Regulation of the broker-dealer industry by a self-regulatory
organization (SRO) 1 is an integral part of the federal regulatory scheme
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the Exchange Act). As a result,
the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), the sole SRO for
U.S. broker-dealers, 2 plays an important role in protecting investors,
especially retail investors, and bolstering investor confidence in the
securities industry and capital markets.3 Suppose a retail investor believes
that the sales representative of the brokerage firm with whom she has an
account 4 (colloquially, her “broker”) has abused her trust and caused her
financial loss. The investor likely wants to recover her losses and to see the
broker punished. FINRA, and not the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission (the SEC), is the regulator that primarily addresses her
concerns, the first through its arbitration forum5 and the second through its
disciplinary proceedings. FINRA is the “cop on the beat.” In 2012 FINRA
brought approximately 1500 disciplinary actions against broker-dealer firms
and associated persons, imposed fines of more than $68 million, and
* Charles Hartsock Professor of Law and Director, Corporate Law Center, University of
Cincinnati College of Law. This paper was written for Brooklyn Law School’s February 8, 2013,
symposium on the Growth and Importance of Compliance in Financial Firms: Meaning and
Implications. My thanks to Professor James Fanto for inviting me to participate. Bryan Wisecup
and Christopher Jones, Corporate Law Fellows and UC Law ‘14, provided valuable research
assistance.
1. “Self-regulatory organization” is a defined term in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(Exchange Act), Pub. L. No. 94-29, sec. 3(6), § 3(a)(26), 89 Stat. 97, 100 (1975) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(26) (2012)), and includes a national securities association
registered under 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3. The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, Inc. (FINRA),
previously known as the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. (the NASD), is the only
national securities association.
2. In 2007, the member firm regulation and enforcement functions of the New York Stock
Exchange and NASD were consolidated, and the NASD changed its name to FINRA. The
consolidation was intended to “streamline the broker-dealer regulatory system, combine
technologies, and permit the establishment of a single set of rules and [a single set of] examiners
with complementary areas of expertise [within] a single [SRO].” Self-Regulatory Organizations,
Exchange Act Release No. 55,495, 2007 WL 1260858, at *9 (Mar. 20, 2007). Today FINRA
describes itself as the “leading non-governmental regulator for all securities firms doing business
with the U.S. public.” About FINRA: Leadership, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/AboutFINRA
/Leadership/ (last visited Nov. 17, 2013) (emphasis added).
3. “Our chief role is to protect investors by maintaining the fairness of the U.S. capital
markets.” About FINRA: Leadership, supra note 2.
4. The sales representatives are “associated persons” of the brokerage firm under the
Exchange Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(18).
5. I have previously written about the FINRA securities arbitration process and its importance
to retail investor confidence. See Barbara Black, Is Securities Arbitration Fair to Investors?, 25
PACE L. REV. 1 (2004).
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ordered restitution of $34 million to injured investors. 6 It expelled thirty
firms, barred 294 individuals, and suspended another 549 individuals. 7
Most of FINRA’s disciplinary proceedings are mundane and do not grab
headlines. Consisting of a single broker accused of simple fraud, the
proceedings are frequently uncontested, or if contested, the broker appears
pro se. 8 Thus, FINRA’s enforcement efforts do not garner the headlines that
the SEC receives, 9 and there has been little scholarly interest in FINRA
disciplinary proceedings. 10
My interest in securities self-regulation and, in particular, FINRA
sanctions stems from my service as a member of FINRA’s National
Adjudicatory Council (the NAC) from 2009–2011. The NAC is the
appellate body that reviews initial decisions in FINRA disciplinary and
membership proceedings. 11 Its fourteen members, consisting of seven
industry representatives and seven public representatives, engage in
extended discussions about the facts and circumstances of the cases that
come before it, and the discussions frequently boil down to whether the
misconduct was “egregious,” warranting stiffer sanctions, or something less
serious, sometimes expressed as “serious but not egregious.” FINRA
adjudicators have broad discretion in determining sanctions; 12 there is no
definition of this key concept “egregious.” 13 Although many NAC members

6. About FINRA: What We Do, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/AboutFINRA/WhatWeDo/ (last
visited Nov. 17, 2013).
7. See FINRA Statistics: Statistical Review 2008–2012, FINRA, http://www.finra.org
/Newsroom/Statistics/ (last updated July 12, 2013).
8. See Yin Wilczek, FINRA Enforcement Numbers on Track to Match 2012 Record, Chief
Enforcer Says, BLOOMBERG L., http://about.bloomberglaw.com/law-reports/finra-enforcementnumbers-on-track-to-match-2012-record-chief-enforcer-says/ (last visited Nov. 17, 2013)
(reporting that FINRA Chief of Enforcement says the home office continues to see a significant
number of “single broker cases” involving “petty dishonesty”).
9. It is reported that FINRA CEO Richard Ketchum now seeks greater visibility for FINRA
and is “tracking bigger game.” See Ben Protess, Regulator Plans to Expand Its Focus, N.Y. TIMES
DEALBOOK (Jan. 8, 2013, 12:54 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/01/08/regulator-plansto-expand-its-focus/.
10. Much of the scholarship on securities self-regulation has been written by professors at
Brooklyn Law School. See, e.g., NORMAN S. POSER & JAMES A. FANTO, BROKER-DEALER LAW
AND REGULATION (4th ed. 2007); Roberta Karmel, Should Securities Industry Self-Regulatory
Organizations Be Considered Government Agencies?, 14 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 151 (2008).
Recently, Professor James Park discussed FINRA disciplinary proceedings in Rules, Principles,
and the Competition to Enforce Securities Laws, 100 CAL. L. REV. 115 (2012).
11. National Adjudicatory Council (NAC), FINRA, http://www.finra.org/Industry
/Enforcement/Adjudication/NAC/index.htm (last visited Nov. 17, 2013).
12. March 2006 Revisions to the NASD Sanction Guidelines – FAQ, FINRA,
http://www.finra.org/industry/enforcement/sanctionguidelines/p016371 (last visited Nov. 17,
2013) [hereinafter March 2006 Revisions] (answer to question 7).
13. Id. (answer to question 17) (In determining if a violation is egregious, the adjudicators
“assess the individual facts and circumstances of the case” and “also consider all relevant
aggravating and mitigating factors.”).
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are attorneys, 14 the discussions do not generally involve legal precedent.
The habits of a law professor die hard, however, and my experience has
caused me to think more about the nature of industry self-regulation and, in
particular, the fundamental principles underlying sanctions imposed by an
industry regulator. This Article, the product of that exercise, describes, in
Part I, the evolution of securities self-regulation since the 1938 Maloney
Act and, in Part II, the theory and practice of FINRA sanctions.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF SECURITIES SELF-REGULATION
A. CONTRASTING VIEWS ON SECURITIES SELF-REGULATION
Although regulation of the broker-dealer industry by an SRO has long
been part of the federal regulatory system, the model of self-regulation has
not migrated to other participants and products regulated under the federal
securities laws. In recent years Congress has considered authorizing SROs
for mutual funds 15 and investment advisers; 16 in both instances, however,
the proposals did not move forward. While there can be many reasons why
new SROs did not come into existence, 17 the lack of enthusiasm for them
may suggest doubts about the self-regulatory model. Both Congress and the
SEC have viewed it with suspicion and refer to “the natural lack of
enthusiasm for regulation on the part of the group to be regulated” 18 as a
serious flaw in the self-regulatory model. According to the SEC, “[i]nherent
in self-regulation is the conflict of interest that exists when an organization

14. Of the 2013 NAC members, all of the seven public members are lawyers (five of them law
professors), and three of the industry members (Mahon, Ostergaard, and Senatore) are lawyers.
See National Adjudicatory Council, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/Industry/Enforcement
/Adjudication/NAC/naccommittee/ (last updated Jan. 17, 2013).
15. See Barbara Black, Are Retail Investors Better Off Today?, 2 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. &
COM. L. 303, 319–20 & nn.113–14 (2008) (describing congressional consideration of new models
for regulating mutual fund industry as aftermath of the market timing and late trading abuses).
16. Section 914(a)(2)(B) of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1830 (2010) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-11),
required the SEC to report to Congress on the extent to which an SRO for investment advisers
would improve the frequency of examinations of investment advisers. The SEC’s study,
conducted by the Staff of the Division of Investment Management of the SEC, set forth three
options to address the SEC’s lack of resources to conduct regular examinations, including
authorization of one or more SROs to examine registered investment advisers. See STAFF OF THE
DIV. OF INV. MGMT. OF THE SEC, STUDY ON ENHANCING INVESTMENT ADVISER EXAMINATIONS
39 (2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2011/914studyfinal.pdf.
17. See Mark Schoeff Jr., At Crucial Hearing, Deck Will Be Stacked Against SRO Opponents,
INVESTMENT NEWS, http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20120605/BLOG07/120609962 (last
visited Nov. 17, 2013). Both the mutual fund and investment advisory industries opposed
regulation by an SRO, at least in part because of additional costs associated with another
regulator. Id. In addition, FINRA initially sought to become the SRO for investment advisers,
which the advisory industry fought because it views the regulatory model for investment advisers
as fundamentally different from the broker-dealer model. Id.
18. SECURITIES INDUSTRY STUDY, S. REP. NO. 93-13, at 145 (1973) [hereinafter SECURITIES
INDUSTRY STUDY].
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both serves the commercial interests of and regulates its members or
users.” 19 In addition to a tendency to protect the economic interests of its
members, there are persistent concerns about uneven and discriminatory
enforcement, particularly by larger, more established firms against smaller,
newer entrants. 20
There is, however, an alternative, positive view of the self-regulatory
model that has plausibility. Indeed, no one may be more motivated to
discipline brokers and to remove bad brokers from the industry than the
industry itself. 21 Good firms spend considerable resources on training their
salespersons and other employees and on maintaining compliance programs
to prevent violations; bad firms, in contrast, scrimp on these costs. The
actions of bad actors, nevertheless, will cost the entire industry in terms of
loss of investor confidence and increased government surveillance. 22 In
addition, self-regulation may be more effective than government regulation
because of industry experience and expertise, the ability to perform detailed
oversight functions, and greater acceptance of regulation by the industry
rather than by the government. 23 It is frequently asserted that industry
regulators can enforce ethical standards that are loftier than mere legal
compliance, 24 although, as I discuss later on, this assertion, if ever true, is
questionable today. 25 Finally, as a practical matter, the size of the brokerage
industry means that the SEC could not be the primary enforcer without a
significant infusion of resources, and the federal government prefers that

19. Concept Release Concerning Self-Regulation, Exchange Act Release No. 50,700, 2004
WL 2648179 § I, at *2 (Nov. 18, 2004) [hereinafter SEC Concept Release].
20. See infra notes 94–103 and accompanying text (discussing the NASD’s 1996 scandal
involving collusion among market makers); see also SEC Concept Release, supra note 19,
§ IV.A.I, at *7 (discussing concerns about undue influence of large member firms).
21. See Paul S. Grant, The National Association of Securities Dealers: Its Origin and
Operation, 1942 WIS. L. REV. 597, 608 (describing disciplinary proceedings and stating that “the
experience and judgment of men in the business are the best qualifications for fair, even strict
determination of findings and penalties” and “[t]he members passing on complaints are
determined that the industry will raise its standards”); see also Onnig H. Dombalagian, Self and
Self-Regulation: Resolving The SRO Identity Crisis, 1 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 317, 321–
22 (2007) (describing reciprocal regulation to signal higher standards of care adhered to by SRO
members).
22. William A. Birdthistle & M. Todd Henderson, Becoming a Fifth Branch, 99 CORNELL L.
REV. 1, 8–12 (2013).
23. SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
H.R. REP. NO. 88-95, pt. 4, at 693–94 (1963) [hereinafter SEC SPECIAL STUDY]; JOEL SELIGMAN,
THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE 439 (3d ed. 2003).
24. SEC SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 23, at 722.
25. For example, it is unlikely that the NASD could enforce a view of manipulation that was
contrary to the SEC’s. See infra notes 104–107 and accompanying text (discussing NASD v. SEC,
431 F.3d 803 (D.C. Cir. 2005)). In Dep’t of Mkt. Regulation v. Leighton, Complaint No.
CLG050021, 2010 WL 781457, at *2 (FINRA NAC Mar. 3, 2010), the NAC reversed the findings
of the Extended Hearing Panel’s majority based on a “tenuous” industry standard that limited the
profits an institutional sales trader could make on trades.
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the industry pay these regulatory costs.26 For this reason alone, whatever the
assessment of its strengths and weaknesses, self-regulation of the brokerdealer industry is here to stay.
B. THE CURRENT STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
Section 15A of the Exchange Act, which provides for the registration
with the SEC of national securities associations, has been amended
frequently since its initial enactment in 1938 in the Maloney Act.27 We first
set forth the current statutory framework and then discuss the legislative
history of the Maloney Act and subsequent significant developments.
Section 15A provides that an association of brokers and dealers may be
registered as a “national securities association” (NSA) if it applies for
registration with the SEC and meets the statutory requirements as well as
others prescribed by the SEC. 28 In order for an association of brokers and
dealers to be registered as an NSA, the SEC must make a number of
determinations, including that the association is “able to carry out the
purposes of [the Exchange Act]” and “to enforce compliance by its
members and persons associated with its members, with the provisions” of
the Exchange Act and its rules and the rules of the association.29 The
association must adopt rules designed for a variety of enumerated purposes,
including “to prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices, to
promote just and equitable principles of trade . . . , and, in general, to
protect investors and the public interest.” 30 The association’s rules must
provide for appropriate discipline of its members and associated persons for
violations of the Exchange Act and its rules and the association’s rules. 31
The statute authorizes a broad range of sanctions, including “expulsion,
suspension, limitation of activities, functions, and operations, fine, censure,
being suspended or barred from being associated with a member, or any
other fitting sanction.” 32
The statute requires that the association’s rules set forth “a fair
procedure” for the discipline of its members and associated persons. 33 In
26. See SEC Concept Release, supra note 19, § IV.D, at *19 (citing self-funding as “[o]ne of
the key historical benefits” of securities self-regulation); DIV. OF MKT. REGULATION, SEC,
MARKET 2000: AN EXAMINATION OF CURRENT EQUITY MARKET DEVELOPMENTS app. at VI - 6
(1994), available at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/market2000.pdf (explaining that
experience with the Securities and Exchange Commission Only (SECO) program shows that SEC
resources necessary to assume direct regulation of broker-dealers “are not realistically
attainable”).
27. Exchange Act, Pub. L. No. 75-719, sec. 1, § 15A, 52 Stat. 1070, 1070–75 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3 (2012)).
28. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(a).
29. Id. § 78o-3(b)(2).
30. Id. § 78o-3(b)(6).
31. Id. § 78o-3(b)(7).
32. Id.
33. Id. § 78o-3(b)(8).
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addition, the statute specifies certain procedures to assure notice and an
opportunity to be heard, as well as the creation of a reviewable record. In
any disciplinary proceeding, the association must “bring specific charges,
notify such member or person of, and give him an opportunity to defend
against, such charges, and keep a record.” 34 A determination to impose a
disciplinary sanction must be accompanied by a statement setting forth (A)
the act or practice that the member or associated person was found to have
engaged or found to have omitted; (B) the specific provision of the
Exchange Act, its rules, or the SRO rules which the act, practice, or
omission violated; and (C) the sanction imposed and the reason for it. 35
FINRA disciplinary proceedings are heard before a panel chaired by a
professional hearing officer and two industry representatives.36 Any party
may seek to appeal a hearing panel’s decision to the NAC, and the NAC
may decide on its own to hear an appeal. 37 The NAC’s decision is FINRA’s
final action on the matter unless FINRA’s Board of Governors decides to
review it. 38
All disciplinary proceedings are subject to de novo review by the SEC,
on the agency’s own motion or upon application by any “aggrieved”
person. 39 So that the SEC is kept apprised of SRO disciplinary proceedings,
the SRO is required to provide the agency notice of any final disciplinary
sanction containing such information as the agency requires by rule. 40 To
uphold any sanction imposed by the SRO, the SEC must make findings that
the member or associated person
has engaged in such acts or practices, or has omitted such acts, as the selfregulatory organization has found him to have engaged in or omitted, that
such acts or practices, or omissions to act, are in violation of such
provisions of this chapter, the rules or regulations thereunder, [or] the
rules of the self-regulatory organization, . . . and that such provisions are,
and were applied in a manner, consistent with the purposes of this
41
chapter.

If, however, the SEC does not make the requisite findings of a
violation, then it must set aside the sanction and, “if appropriate,” remand to

34. Id. § 78o-3(h)(1).
35. Id.
36. Adjudication, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/Industry/Enforcement/Adjudication/ (last
visited Nov. 17, 2013). FINRA Code of Procedure Rules 9231 and 9232 set forth the criteria for
selection of panelists. Code of Procedure, FINRA, http://finra.complinet.com/en/display
/display_viewall.html?rbid=2403&element_id=3895&record_id=11675 (last visited Nov. 17,
2013).
37. Adjudication, supra note 36.
38. Id.
39. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(d)(2).
40. Id. § 78s(d)(1). The notice requirement is set forth in SEC Rule 19d-1. Notices by SelfRegulatory Organizations, 17 C.F.R. § 240.19d-1 (2013).
41. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(e)(1)(A).
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the SRO for further proceedings. 42 Moreover, after the SEC makes the
requisite findings of a violation, if it finds, “having due regard for the public
interest and the protection of investors,” that the sanction imposed by the
SRO “imposes any burden on competition not necessary or appropriate in
furtherance of the purposes of this chapter or is excessive or oppressive,”
then it may “cancel, reduce, or require the remission of such sanction.” 43
Although the statute is phrased in terms of agency discretion, according to
the D.C. Circuit, the SEC must, when reviewing a FINRA disciplinary
action, consider whether the sanction is “excessive or oppressive” and must
carefully consider any aggravating or mitigating factors relevant to the
determination of an appropriate sanction.44
Finally, the Exchange Act provides for judicial review of an SEC final
order by a “person aggrieved” by the order. 45 The standard of review is the
“arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
with law” standard set forth in the Administrative Procedure Act.46
C. EVOLVING VIEWS ON SECURITIES SELF-REGULATION
Since its inception in 1939, FINRA (including its predecessor, the
NASD) has evolved from a membership association primarily responsible
for enforcing industry norms to a regulator that enforces federal securities
laws as an adjunct of the SEC. This section summarizes the milestones in
that development.47
1. The Maloney Act
The original concept of securities self-regulation was that of
membership associations having contractual powers to enforce sound
business practices and ethical standards that were considered beyond the
scope of government regulation.48 As described by William Douglas: 49
Self-regulation . . . can be pervasive and subtle in its conditioning
influence over business practices and business morality. By and large,
government can operate satisfactorily only by proscription. That leaves
untouched large areas of conduct and activity; some of it susceptible of

42. Id. § 78s(e)(1)(B).
43. Id. § 78s(e)(2). The SEC also has discretion to remand to the SRO for further proceedings.
Id. § 78s(e)(1)(A).
44. Saad v. SEC, 718 F.3d 904, 909, 913 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
45. 15 U.S.C. § 78y(a)(1).
46. Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 89-554, § 706(2)(A), 80 Stat. 378, 393 (1966)
(codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012)); Saad, 718 F.3d at 910.
47. See generally Karmel, supra note 10 (describing how at least some of the “self” has been
taken out of FINRA).
48. SELIGMAN, supra note 23, at 186.
49. Justice Douglas served as Chairman of the SEC from 1937–39. SEC Historical Summary
of Chairmen and Commissioners, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/about/sechistoricalsummary.htm (last
visited Nov. 17, 2013).
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government regulation but in fact too minute for satisfactory control; some
of it lying beyond the periphery of the law in the realm of ethics and
morality. Into these larger areas self-government and self-government
50
alone, can effectively reach.

The Exchange Act, as enacted in 1934, designated national securities
exchanges, principally the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), as SROs
with the responsibility to regulate member broker-dealers but did not
provide for self-regulation of broker-dealers operating in the over-thecounter (OTC) markets. Congress addressed this lacuna in 1938. The
Maloney Act amended the Exchange Act to set up “a system for
cooperative regulation of the over-the-counter markets, through the
activities of voluntary associations of investment bankers, dealers and
brokers doing business in these markets, under appropriate governmental
supervision.” 51 The legislative history identified three aspects to regulation
of the OTC markets:
First, to protect the investor and the honest dealer alike from dishonest and
unfair practices by the submarginal element in the industry; second, to
cope with those methods of doing business which, while technically
outside the area of definite illegality, are nevertheless unfair both to
customer and decent competitor, and are seriously damaging to the
mechanism of the free and open market; and, third, to afford to the
investor an economic service the efficiency of which will be
commensurate with its economic importance, so that the machinery of the
Nation’s markets will operate to avoid the misdirection of the Nation’s
savings, which contributes powerfully toward economic depressions and
52
breeds distrust of our financial processes.

Congress identified two regulatory alternatives. Rejecting the first, a
“pronounced expansion of the [SEC],” with a large increase in expenditure
of public funds, accompanied by “a minute, detailed, and rigid regulation of
business conduct by law,” 53 Congress opted for “cooperative regulation,” 54
as described by Senator Maloney:
The Federal Government, through the Securities and Exchange
Commission, says to the investment bankers of the country, “You may
create your own association or associations. You may provide your own
rules and your own regulations. We want you to run your own business.
We want a representation, however. We want a right of review and
supervision.” So, while some of us would like to call what is provided for

50. SECURITIES INDUSTRY STUDY, supra note 18, at 149.
51. REGULATION OF OVER-THE-COUNTER MARKETS, H.R. REP. NO. 75-2307, at 2 (1938);
REGULATION OF OVER-THE-COUNTER MARKETS, S. REP. NO. 75-1455, at 1 (1938).
52. H.R. REP NO. 75-2307, at 4.
53. Id.
54. Id.
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self-regulations, it is in effect a cooperative regulation . . . . It is purely
55
voluntary.

Similarly, the purpose of the legislation was “to enable the people of
this business to guide and direct the affairs of their own industry under
government supervision.” 56 The legislation presupposed that “regulation
can best be achieved by the efforts of honest brokers and dealers themselves
. . . .” 57 The SEC is “injected into the association or associations to prevent
the growth of monopoly and to protect the rights of minorities, and the little
dealer as well as the small buyers.” 58
Consistent with the concept that the membership associations would
enforce their own rules, Exchange Act section 15A, as originally enacted,
did not explicitly give NSAs the authority to bring disciplinary proceedings
for violations of federal securities laws and regulations. 59 It was not until
the 1975 amendments to the Exchange Act that NSAs had express authority
to enforce the Exchange Act and its rules, although prior thereto, the NASD
had enforced at least some federal securities provisions through its general
requirement of “high standards of commercial honor and just and equitable
principles.” 60
The NASD was established in 1939 and was—and continues to be
through its successor, FINRA—the sole NSA for broker-dealers. 61
2. The SEC’s Special Study of Securities Markets
In 1961 Congress appropriated funds for the SEC to undertake “a broad
study of the adequacy of investor protection in the securities markets,” 62
including an examination of the OTC market. Joel Seligman, the foremost
historian of the SEC, described the Special Study of Securities Markets (the
Special Study), conducted by a quasi-independent group within the SEC, as
“the single most influential document published in the history of the
SEC.” 63 A principal component of the Special Study is “a factual
documentation of the limits of self-regulation in the securities industry,” 64
including the performance of the securities exchanges and the NASD as
well as the SEC’s oversight of them.
The Special Study described the evolution of the NASD from “a
somewhat unique experiment in supervised self-regulation” to “an
55. 83 CONG. REC. 4451 (1938) (statement of Sen. Francis Maloney).
56. Senator Francis Maloney, Radio Address on Over-the-Counter Securities Markets (Feb.
25, 1938), in 83 CONG. REC. app. at 789 (1938).
57. Id. at 790.
58. Id.
59. See SEC SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 23, at 646.
60. Id. at 646 n.420.
61. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
62. SEC SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 23, pt. 1, at iii (Letter of Transmittal).
63. SELIGMAN, supra note 23, at 299.
64. Id.
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established part of the regulatory scheme exerting a substantial influence on
numerous phases of the securities industry.” 65 In its judgment, the NASD
was at a crossroads 66 because “its capacity to do its job is overtaxed:” 67
“The NASD’s job of self-regulation is an enormous one in every
dimension, but from the beginning it has sought to adhere to a concept of
self-regulation with a maximum emphasis on ‘self’—members in the
securities business regulating themselves—and with minimal reliance on
full-time paid staff.” 68
With respect to the NASD’s disciplinary proceedings, the Special Study
reported that the NASD “placed great emphasis on informality and
simplicity in all phases of the disciplinary process” 69—what was important
to the membership was that decisions were “made by businessmen based
upon their knowledge of the procedures of their business.” 70 The Special
Study concluded that the principal problem with disciplinary proceedings
was lack of efficiency and speed in handling cases; 71 it also found troubling
disparities in the penalties for certain kinds of misconduct that suggested
discrimination against smaller firms. 72
To address the NASD’s deficiencies, the Special Study called for the
creation of a larger professional staff with greater responsibilities, 73
centralization of enforcement authority, and permanent hearing officers for
disciplinary hearings. 74 In addition, the Special Study observed that the
NASD’s “purpose of promoting voluntary compliance with ethical
standards beyond the reach of formal regulation has limited its resort to
codification or other ‘legalistic’ techniques that might ease its burden of
day-to-day regulation.” 75 In short, in the view of the Special Study, the
NASD should become more bureaucratic, with a professional staff and a
rulebook. These recommendations signaled a significant change in the

65.
66.
67.
68.

SEC SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 23, at 673.
Id. at 674.
Id.
Id.; see Howard C. Westwood & Edward G. Howard, Self-Government in the Securities
Business, 17 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 518, 533 (1952) (describing how, when the NASD applied to
register with the SEC, it originally contemplated that it would not need a paid staff, but the SEC
objected and also thought the proposed schedule of membership fees was too low).
69. SEC SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 23, at 664.
70. Id. at 665 (quoting letter from the NASD’s executive director); Grant, supra note 21, at
608 (describing disciplinary proceedings and stating that “the experience and judgment of men in
the business are the best qualifications for fair, even strict determination of findings and penalties”
and “[t]he members passing on complaints are determined that the industry will raise its
standards”).
71. SEC SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 23, at 681.
72. Id. at 666 (describing the relative leniency in free-riding cases in contrast to net capital
violations; the former is not found primarily in marginal firms).
73. Id. at 676. “[T]he NASD’s paid staff should be increased in size, stature, and responsibility
. . . .” Id. at 680.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 679.
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concept of securities self-regulation that was implemented in subsequent
amendments to the Exchange Act.
3. 1964 Amendments to the Exchange Act
In 1964 Congress amended section 15A of the Exchange Act to require,
for the first time, that NSAs have standards of financial responsibility for
member firms and standards of training, experience, and other
qualifications for associated persons. The amendment also permitted the
NASD to bring disciplinary proceedings against associated persons without
proceeding against their firms. 76 According to the Senate report
accompanying the legislation, the amendments “contemplate[d] an even
greater degree of reliance upon self-regulation, although under somewhat
more intensive [SEC] supervision.” 77
In addition, the Senate report essentially repudiated the Maloney Act’s
concept of a voluntary membership association enforcing through contract
its business and ethical standards on its members and instead emphasized
that the association was a regulator acting pursuant to delegated authority:
“Registered securities associations are not private clubs. They are organized
under statutory authority to perform, under governmental oversight,
regulatory functions in the over-the-counter securities market.” 78
This emphasis on delegated government power becomes the dominant
theme in subsequent congressional consideration of the concept of
securities self-regulation, although lip service is still paid to the Maloney
Act’s concept of self-regulation.
4. The Securities Industry Study of 1973
In 1970, when Congress enacted the Securities Investor Protection Act
to address the crisis caused by the failures of a number of large NYSE firms
and to deal with the threat of loss of investor confidence, a number of
Senators expressed concern that the securities industry was in need of
fundamental reform. 79 As a result, in 1971 the Senate authorized a thorough
study of the securities industry and the securities markets, conducted by the
Subcommittee on Securities of the Committee on Banking, Housing and
Urban Affairs, which was completed in 1973. 80 The Securities Industry
Study made a number of conclusions and recommendations, many of them
concerning industry self-regulation, including that “[t]he division of
76. Summary and Interpretation of Amendments to Securities Act of 1933 and Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 Contained in the Securities Acts Amendments of 1964, Securities Act
Release No. 4725, Exchange Act Release No. 7425, 1964 WL 67875, at *15 (Sept. 29, 1964).
77. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION LEGISLATION 1963, S. REP. NO. 88-379, at 42
(1963).
78. Id.
79. SECURITIES INDUSTRY STUDY, supra note 18, at 1.
80. Id. at 3.
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responsibility between the SEC and the self-regulatory organizations
requires redefinition to establish clearer lines of responsibility for
decisionmaking.” 81 The Securities Industry Study emphasized that
there is a common and serious misunderstanding of the nature and limits
of the concept of self-regulation . . . . [S]elf-regulation is thought to mean
that the securities industry regulates itself and therefore is not regulated by
the government. Such a conception of self-regulation is seriously
misleading in failing to acknowledge the essential and continuing role of
82
the federal government.

The Securities Industry Study expressed a great deal of skepticism about
securities self-regulation and described the
inherent limitations in allowing an industry to regulate itself . . . : the
natural lack of enthusiasm for regulation on the part of the group to be
regulated, the temptation to use a façade of industry regulation as a shield
to ward off more meaningful regulation, the tendency for businessmen to
use collective action to advance their interests through the imposition of
purely anti-competitive restraints as opposed to those justified by
regulatory needs, and a resistance to changes in the regulatory pattern
83
because of vested economic interests in its preservation.

Despite this lack of enthusiasm for securities self-regulation, the
Securities Industry Study acknowledged practical realities: that “the
Congress was well aware of the serious practical problems confronting the
government if it were to assume the entire regulatory burden.” 84
Accordingly, Congress established a regulatory model that balanced the
“limitations and dangers” 85 of self-regulation against “‘the sheer
ineffectiveness of attempting to assure [regulation] directly through the
Government on a wide scale.’” 86
In addition, the Securities Industry Study did acknowledge that
securities self-regulation had significant advantages apart from its practical
necessity, which included bringing industry members’ expertise to bear on
the regulatory issues and involving industry members in the regulatory
process. 87 Indeed, what it identified as the most important advantage
harkened back to the Maloney Act’s original concept: “its potential for

81. Id. Seligman notes that Congress was frustrated with the SEC’s passivity in supervising the
SROs and that “[b]etween 1971 and 1975, the SEC’s supervision of stock market regulation was
the subject of almost incessant congressional hearings and reports.” SELIGMAN, supra note 23, at
443.
82. SECURITIES INDUSTRY STUDY, supra note 18, at 137.
83. Id. at 145 (footnote omitted).
84. Id. at 146.
85. Id.
86. Id. (quotation marks in original).
87. Id. at 149.
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establishing and enforcing what Mr. Justice Douglas referred to as ‘ethical
standards beyond those any law can establish.’” 88
5. 1975 Amendments to the Exchange Act
Somewhat surprisingly, the NASD did not have express statutory
authority to enforce the Exchange Act and its rules until the 1975
amendments to the Exchange Act. 89 The 1975 amendments also
strengthened SEC oversight in several key respects, including procedures
applicable to SEC review of SRO proposed rule changes 90 and SRO
disciplinary actions. 91 In addition, Congress reinforced the notion that SROs
are not “private clubs” by requiring that their governing bodies have at least
one public member, i.e., not from the industry. 92
Once again, the legislative history emphasized that “self-regulatory
organizations exercise authority subject to SEC oversight. They have no
authority to regulate independently of the SEC’s control.” 93
6. The NASD’s 1996 Scandal Involving Collusion Among
Market Makers
In the 1990s, both the U.S. Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division
and the SEC investigated allegations of abusive practices by Nasdaq market
makers to suppress competition and mislead customers. 94 In 1996 the SEC
and the NASD entered a settlement after the agency instituted public
proceedings against the NASD. 95 The SEC, in addition to making findings
of misconduct in the Nasdaq market by Nasdaq market makers, found that
the NASD inadequately enforced its rules applicable to market makers and
processed certain membership applications in a manner inconsistent with its
rules, both of which were attributable to the undue influence of market
makers in the NASD regulatory processes. 96 The SEC also found that the
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id. (footnote omitted).
Exchange Act, Pub. L. No. 94-29, sec. 12, § 15A, 89 Stat. 97, 127–31 (1975).
Id. sec. 16, § 19(b)–(c), 89 Stat. at 147–50.
Id. sec. 16, § 19(d)–(e), 89 Stat. at 150–51.
Id. sec. 12(2), § 15A(b)(4), 89 Stat. at 127.
SECURITIES ACTS AMENDMENTS OF 1975, S. REP. NO. 94-75, at 23 (1975), reprinted in
1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 179, 201.
94. SEC, REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 21(A) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
REGARDING THE NASD AND THE NASDAQ MARKET (1996) [hereinafter SEC, REPORT PURSUANT
TO SECTION 21(A)], available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/investreport/nasdaq21a.htm.
95. The SEC can impose sanctions on an SRO if it finds, on the record and after notice and
opportunity for a hearing, that the SRO has violated or is unable to comply with any provision of
the Securities Exchange Act and its rules, or the SRO’s own rules. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(h)(1) (2012).
96. NASD, Exchange Act Release No. 37,538, 1996 WL 447193 (Aug. 8, 1996) [hereinafter
NASD Release]. For background on the Nasdaq trading practices at issue, see SELIGMAN, supra
note 23, at 698–702. Arthur Levitt, the SEC Chairman at the time, acknowledged that the SEC
itself “failed to see that the NASD had gradually been taken over by a cabal of dealers who used
the NASD’s disciplinary process to punish certain players, such as daytraders, while failing to
prosecute serious infractions by market-makers.” Id. at 699 (quoting ARTHUR LEVITT, TAKE ON
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influence exerted by the market makers resulted in the NASD staff’s
targeting less-favored constituencies in examinations and disciplinary
actions. 97 The NASD did not admit or deny the findings.
In response to the scandal, prior to the SEC settlement, the NASD had
already accepted the recommendation of its Select Committee headed by
former Senator Warren Rudman to review Nasdaq structure and
governance 98 and determined to separate the NASD’s market and regulatory
functions. 99 The SEC censured the NASD and required it to consent to a
number of reforms, including reforms designed to reduce the influence of
members over regulatory and disciplinary matters. Thus, the settlement
required “at least 50% independent public and non-industry membership on
its Board of Governors” and on the boards of all subsidiaries and affiliates
that have self-regulatory functions, and on the major NASD committees,
including the predecessor to the NAC, the National Business Conduct
Committee. 100 The participation of industry members in disciplinary
proceedings was also reduced. The NASD was required to institute the use
of professional hearing officers—“who shall be attorneys with appropriate
experience and training”—to preside over disciplinary proceedings. 101 In
addition, the NASD was required “to provide for the autonomy and
independence of the regulatory staff” so that the staff would have sole
discretion as to what matters to investigate and prosecute, subject only to
supervision of the Board of Governors, and would be “generally insulated
from the commercial interests of its members and the Nasdaq market.” 102
As a result of this demonstration of the fatal flaw of securities selfregulation—the undue influence exerted by powerful members—the
NASD’s transformation into a professional regulator largely independent of
its membership, as recommended by the 1963 Special Study, was
substantially accomplished. Today, after the 2007 consolidation, FINRA
describes itself as the “leading non-governmental regulator for all securities
firms doing business with the U.S. public.” 103

THE STREET: WHAT WALL STREET AND CORPORATE AMERICA DON’T WANT YOU TO KNOW
183–84 (2002)).
97. Specifically, NASD staff targeted day trading firms that used Nasdaq’s Small Order
Execution System. See SEC, REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 21(A), supra note 94, at 40–44.
98. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. NO. GAO-02-362, SECURITIES MARKETS:
COMPETITION AND MULTIPLE REGULATORS HEIGHTEN CONCERNS ABOUT SELF-REGULATION 11
(2002), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/240/234468.pdf.
99. Id. at 8; see also SELIGMAN, supra note 23, at 701–02.
100. NASD Release, supra note 96, § IV.B.1, at *3.
101. Id. § IV.B.3.
102. Id. § IV.B.4, at *4.
103. About FINRA: Leadership, supra note 2 (emphasis added).
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7. The Current View of Securities Self-Regulation
As this brief history demonstrates, the concept of FINRA has evolved
from a voluntary membership organization enforcing through contract its
business practices and ethical standards to a regulator that is independent
from its membership, whose authority to enforce federal securities laws
derives from Congress and is subject to SEC oversight. Two appellate
opinions underscore this transformation.
In NASD v. SEC, the NASD sought judicial review of an SEC order that
set aside the NAC’s findings of market manipulation in violation of
Exchange Act section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 and the sanctions imposed for
that violation, which were expulsion of the member firm and an industry
bar of its owner. 104 The SEC concluded that the evidence did not establish
that the respondents committed market manipulation. 105 In ruling that the
NASD did not have standing to appeal the SEC order, the D.C. Circuit
described it as a “quasi-governmental agency, with express statutory
authority to adjudicate actions against members who are accused of illegal
securities practices and to sanction members found to have violated the
Exchange Act or [SEC] regulations issued pursuant thereto.” 106 The
NASD’s subordinate status was clear. Under the statutory scheme providing
for securities self-regulation, “[t]he NASD’s authority to discipline its
members for violations of federal securities law is entirely derivative. The
authority it exercises ultimately belongs to the SEC, and the legal views of
the self-regulatory organization must yield to the Commission’s view of the
law.” 107
The court held that the NASD, as a first-level adjudicator, was not a
“person aggrieved” that can appeal an SEC decision under Exchange Act
section 25(a). 108 It rejected summarily the NASD’s argument that it was “an
aggrieved person” based on its staff’s frustration in its mission because it
would be unable to bring disciplinary proceedings except in the narrow
circumstances covered by the SEC decision: 109 “Simply put, the NASD

104. NASD v. SEC, 431 F.3d 803, 804–05 (D.C. Cir. 2005). As the court noted throughout the
opinion, this was the first case in nearly seventy years in which the NASD sought judicial review
of an SEC order when the NASD was acting as an adjudicator. Id. at 811.
105. The NAC stated that the question presented by the appeal was “whether a market marker
that trades a small volume of stock can violate the antifraud provisions of SEC and NASD rules
when the evidence demonstrates that the firm took actions that were designed to artificially
increase the price of the stock” and answered the question in the affirmative. Mkt. Regulation v.
Elgindy, Complaint No. CMS000015, 2003 WL 21203080, at *1 (NASD NAC May 7, 2003). The
SEC, however, concluded that the record did not support a finding that the respondents’ actions
were part of a manipulative scheme. Elgindy, Exchange Act Release No. 49,389, 2004 WL
865791, at *4–5 (Mar. 10, 2004).
106. NASD, 431 F.3d at 804.
107. Id. at 806.
108. Id. at 805.
109. Id. at 809–10.
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appears before this court as a disgruntled first-level tribunal, complaining
because it has been reversed by a higher tribunal.” 110
The question left unaddressed by NASD v. SEC was whether FINRA
could adopt and enforce its own definition of market manipulation apart
from the Exchange Act as a violation of its requirement that members
observe “high standards of commercial honor and just and equitable
principles of trade.” 111 Fiero v. FINRA, 112 discussed next, suggests that
courts would not be receptive to efforts to impose significant sanctions for
violations that were based solely on ethical standards that go beyond the
antifraud provisions of the Exchange Act.
Fiero even more clearly demonstrates that courts view FINRA’s powers
as exclusively derived from the Exchange Act. 113 In 2002 the NAC
affirmed a hearing panel’s findings that Fiero Brothers, Inc., a member
firm, and John Fiero, its president (collectively, the Fieros) engaged in
market manipulation and its sanctions of expulsion/bar from the industry
and a $1 million fine imposed jointly and severally on the Fieros. 114 The
Fieros did not appeal the NAC’s decision to the SEC. 115 After the Fieros
refused to pay the fine, FINRA commenced an action in New York state
court. 116 The trial court awarded judgment in its favor, upholding its
authority to bring the action under contract law, because the Fieros had
agreed to comply with the SRO’s rules, including imposition of fines and
sanctions, when the firm became a NASD member and Fiero became an
associated person of the firm. 117 The court further noted that “‘New York
state courts have long recognized the right of a private membership
organization to impose fines on its members, when authorized to do so by
statute, charter or by-laws.’” 118 New York’s highest court, however,
subsequently reversed on the ground that the federal courts possessed
exclusive jurisdiction because the FINRA complaint was an action to

110. Id. at 809.
111. FINRA Rules, FINRA, http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_viewall.html?rbid
=2403&element_id=607&record_id=609 (last visited Nov. 17, 2013) (FINRA Rule 2010,
formerly NASD Conduct Rule 2110).
112. Fiero v. FINRA, 660 F.3d 569 (2d Cir. 2011).
113. See id. at 576.
114. The hearing panel also found, and the NAC affirmed, a finding that the Fieros violated a
NASD Rule. The NAC imposed the $1 million fine for the market manipulation claim. Dep’t of
Enforcement v. Fiero, Complaint No. CAF980002, 2002 WL 31476976, at *33 n.60 (NASD NAC
Oct. 28, 2002).
115. If the Fieros had appealed and the SEC had affirmed the NAC fine, the SEC would have
had the authority to bring a proceeding to collect the fine under Exchange Act § 21(e). Fiero, 660
F.3d at 574–75; but see id. at 575 n.7 (expressly noting that the issue of SEC authority was not
before the court).
116. NASD v. Fiero, No. 102755/04, 2006 WL 5251396 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 11, 2006).
117. NASD v. Fiero, 882 N.E.2d 879 (N.Y. 2008).
118. Fiero, 660 F.3d at 572 (citing NASD v. Fiero, No. 102755/04, slip op. at 2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Sept. 12, 2005), rev’d on other grounds, 882 N.E.2d 879 (N.Y. 2008)).
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enforce a liability or duty created under the Exchange Act.119 The Fieros
then brought an action in federal district court, seeking a declaratory
judgment that FINRA had no authority to collect fines through judicial
proceedings; FINRA filed a counterclaim, again seeking to enforce the fine
under contract theory. 120 Reversing the district court’s judgment in favor of
FINRA, the court of appeals held that the Exchange Act did not confer on
FINRA authority to bring judicial actions to enforce collection of its
fines. 121
The court of appeals’ analysis was based on the premise that “where
FINRA enforces statutory or administrative rules, or enforces its own rules
promulgated pursuant to statutory or administrative authority, it is
exercising the powers granted to it under the Exchange Act.”122 The court
of appeals relied principally on the statutory language: while Exchange Act
section 15A(b) confers on SROs the power and obligation to discipline
members and impose sanctions, including fines, the Exchange Act did not
expressly confer on SROs the power to bring judicial actions to collect
fines. 123 The court contrasted this with statutory provisions conferring
express power on the SEC to seek judicial enforcement of monetary
penalties and concluded on this basis that the omission of comparable
power to SROs was intentional. 124 The court also found that FINRA’s
breach of contract theory undermined Exchange Act section 27, which
confers on federal courts exclusive jurisdiction to enforce the Exchange
Act, explaining that “FINRA contract enforcement actions may bristle with
Exchange Act legal issues because the most serious fines levied by FINRA
will be for member violations of the Act.” 125 Assuming that the court was
correct in its assertion that FINRA’s largest fines are imposed for Exchange
Act violations, it did not explain how an action brought to collect a fine
would require courts to interpret the Exchange Act. 126
The court acknowledged that its interpretation left a “seemingly
inexplicable nature of a gap in the FINRA enforcement scheme: fines may
be levied but not collected.” 127 The court, however, did not find this
troublesome because FINRA had another “draconian sanction not involving
court action:” 128 it could expel the member from the industry for non-

119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Fiero, 882 N.E.2d at 882.
Fiero v. FINRA, 606 F. Supp. 2d 500, 502 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
Fiero, 882 N.E.2d at 882.
Fiero, 660 F.3d at 575–76 (emphasis added).
Id. at 574.
Id. at 575.
Id. at 576.
Cf. Fiero v. FINRA, 606 F. Supp. 2d 500, 517–18 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (rejecting this
argument because FINRA is not suing for violations of securities laws or introducing disciplinary
proceedings as evidence of the Fieros’ securities violations).
127. Fiero, 660 F.3d at 576.
128. Id.
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payment or, in this case, refuse to permit the Fieros to re-enter the industry
until they paid the fine. 129 In addition, in a non sequitur, the court observed
that a violator of the Exchange Act would likely face a “panoply of private
and SEC remedies.” 130
Both opinions view the Exchange Act as the exclusive source of
authority for FINRA; the organization has no independent power or
authority. In addition, both opinions adhere to a literal, non-expansive
interpretation of the association’s statutory authority. Neither opinion offers
FINRA any encouragement to explore new regulatory approaches or to be
innovative in its approach to regulation; both opinions emphasize that
FINRA was asserting a power that it had not previously attempted to
exercise.
The current view of securities self-regulation may be a significant
cabining of FINRA’s ability to enforce ethical standards beyond the
antifraud provisions of the Exchange Act for the protection of retail
investors. Yet, because of the seriousness of the sanctions, broker-dealers
and associated persons need fair notice of what kinds of conduct constitute
violations; the law cannot be “soft” or vague. Moreover, the 1996 marketmaker scandal demonstrated that the historic concern for undue industry
influence was not misplaced and that Congress was correct in identifying
the need for more independence from the industry and greater SEC
oversight.
II. FINRA SANCTIONS
As previously described, the Exchange Act requires FINRA to adopt
rules to regulate the conduct of its members 131 and to provide for
appropriate discipline of firms and associated persons for violations of the
Exchange Act and its rules, as well as the SRO’s rules. 132 The statute
authorizes a broad range of sanctions and confers broad discretion on
FINRA to determine the appropriate sanction, subject to the SEC’s power
to reduce a sanction if it imposes an undue burden on competition or is
“excessive or oppressive.” 133 Part II fleshes out the bare statutory
framework and explores the theory and practice of FINRA sanctions.
A. REMEDIAL VERSUS PUNITIVE SANCTIONS
Recall that this Article started with the premise that it is likely, and
indeed understandable, that members of the investing public who have been
harmed by broker-dealer misconduct want to see that bad brokers are

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id.
Id.
15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(6) (2012).
Id. § 78o-3(b)(7).
See supra notes 43–44 and accompanying text.
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punished for their wrongdoing. 134 Public approval for regulators may
decrease if they are seen as “soft” on violators; Robert Khuzami, the former
SEC Director of the Enforcement Division, frequently reminded people that
the SEC was not a federal prosecutor.135 The investing public may be
especially skeptical about industry regulators and suspect them of being soft
on offenders. Moreover, regulators (like the rest of us) probably find it
satisfying to punish; industry regulators may feel a strong sense of
disapproval toward conduct that reflects badly on the industry as a whole. 136
Nevertheless, regulators may not impose sanctions as retribution, because
the wrongdoers deserve it, however satisfying that may be to both the
regulators and the investing public.137
Why is it impermissible for FINRA to punish bad brokers for their
conduct? First, FINRA is a private actor, not an arm of the federal
government. Courts, however, have long recognized that Congress can
confer on private bodies the power to impose sanctions, including the
revocation of licenses.138 The right of disciplined firms and associated
persons to seek de novo SEC review of FINRA’s findings and sanctions,
and the statutory requirement that the agency make its own findings,
provide an additional layer of protection for the individual or firm found to
have committed a violation. 139 In their review of disciplinary orders, the
federal courts of appeals do not distinguish between SEC orders that affirm
FINRA disciplinary sanctions and SEC orders that affirm sanctions
imposed through the SEC’s administrative hearing system; both are
134. See, e.g., 113 Madoff Victims Tell Their Stories, WALL ST. J., June 16, 2009, at C3,
available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124511290745717267.html (reproducing victimimpact statements from 113 victims of Bernard Madoff’s Ponzi scheme filed with court in
advance of Madoff’s sentencing).
135. See, e.g., Robert Khuzami, Dir., Div. of Enforcement, SEC, Remarks Before the Consumer
Federation of America’s Financial Services Conference (Dec. 1, 2011), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2011/spch120111rk.htm (explaining that some of the frustration
at SEC’s performance was rooted in misunderstandings of the SEC’s powers as a civil
enforcement agency).
136. Recent scholarship explaining why public actors choose retributive responses to
wrongdoing include Miriam H. Baer, Choosing Punishment, 92 B.U. L. REV. 577, 577 (2012) and
Max Minzner, Why Agencies Punish, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 853, 853–54 (2012).
137. Minzner, supra note 136, at 904–13 (explaining why there are significant reasons to be
concerned about agencies as retributive entities).
138. See Bd. of Trade v. Wallace, 67 F.2d 402, 407 (7th Cir. 1933); see also Markowski v.
SEC, 34 F.3d 99, 105 (2d Cir. 1994) (rejecting challenges to disciplinary sanctions, noting that the
individual voluntarily submitted himself to the discipline of a self-regulating association whose
power to enforce its standards of conduct “makes its imprimatur meaningful and commercially
valuable to its membership”). In addition, the laws of many states recognize that privatemembership associations may impose sanctions on members when authorized by statute or
governance documents. E.g., NASD v. Fiero, No. 102755/04, slip op. at 2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 12,
2005), rev’d on other grounds, 882 N.E.2d 879 (N.Y. 2008).
139. See Cody v. SEC, 693 F.3d 251, 257 (1st Cir. 2012) (stating that court reviews SEC order
rather than FINRA’s decision); Heath v. SEC, 586 F.3d 122, 142–43 (2d Cir. 2009) (stating that
any procedural errors committed by the hearing officer are cured by the SEC’s thorough de novo
review of the record).
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considered SEC orders. Accordingly, parties rarely raise the objection that
FINRA is not a government body, and if the objection is raised, courts
quickly dispense with it.
The Exchange Act requires that the SRO provide a “fair procedure” for
its disciplinary proceedings, 140 which specifically includes providing
specific charges and an opportunity to be heard. 141 Fairness requires that the
firm or individual has notice that the charged conduct was illegal 142 and that
the SRO bring the charges without undue delay. 143 The protections
accorded those charged with misconduct, however, do not raise to the level
of constitutional protections required when the government seeks to impose
criminal sanctions on those charged with misconduct: need for proof
beyond a reasonable doubt, trial by jury, privilege against self-incrimination
(for individuals), protection from double jeopardy, and right to legal
representation. 144 Courts have dispensed with these constitutional
protections so long as the sanction is remedial and not penal, or
punishment, for past offenses. 145 The Supreme Court defers to legislative
intent, so that conferring a regulatory authority with the power to impose
sanctions denominated as “civil” is prima facie evidence of congressional
intent to provide for a non-criminal sanction.146 The Court, however,
recognizes that even if Congress intended civil sanctions, a statutory
scheme can be so punitive either in purpose or effect as to “‘transfor[m]

140. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(8) (2012). Courts have held that the FINRA procedures mandated by
the Exchange Act require the substance of procedural due process, Cody, 693 F.3d at 357, and are
fair, see Busacca v. SEC, 449 Fed. App’x 886, 891 (11th Cir. 2011), and that procedural errors
committed by the hearing officer can be cured by the SEC’s thorough de novo review of the
record. Heath, 586 F.3d at 142–43.
141. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(h)(1).
142. Even a minimal sanction can be excessive if the individual could not fairly understand that
the conduct was illegal. Upton v. SEC, 75 F.3d 92, 98 (2d Cir. 1996).
143. SRO disciplinary proceedings are not subject to any statute of limitations; “a successful
laches defense requires a lack of due diligence by the [SRO], and prejudice to the [respondent].”
Gluckman, Exchange Act Release No. 41,628, 1999 WL 507864, at *6–7 (July 20, 1999). The
SEC dismissed, for the first time, an SRO disciplinary proceeding on fairness grounds because of
the age of the case, without a showing of prejudice, in Hayden, Exchange Act Release No. 42,772,
2000 WL 571683, at *2 (May 11, 2000), because an SRO has a “statutory obligation to ensure the
fairness and integrity of its disciplinary proceedings.” In Dep’t of Enforcement v. Morgan Stanley
DW Inc., Discip. Proceeding No. CAF000045, 2002 NASD Discip. LEXIS 11 (NASD NAC July
29, 2002), the NAC interpreted Hayden as setting forth a fairness test based on equitable
principles and requiring consideration of the facts and circumstances of the particular case.
144. See, e.g., Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91, 96–103 (1991) (holding that because the
Congress set forth a preponderance of evidence standard for disciplinary proceedings under the
Investment Company Act of 1940 and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, policy arguments for
a higher standard were inapposite).
145. Wright v. SEC, 112 F.2d 89, 94 (2d Cir. 1940).
146. Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 99–103 (1997) (holding that the statutory scheme
under which Office of Comptroller of Currency imposed penalties and debarment on bank officers
demonstrated congressional intent that such penalties be deemed civil, so that the double jeopardy
clause did not protect against criminal prosecution).
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what was clearly intended as a civil remedy into a criminal penalty.’” 147
The Court has identified relevant factors in distinguishing between punitive
and remedial sanctions:
(1) [w]hether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint;
(2) whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment; (3) whether
it comes into play only on a finding of scienter; (4) whether its operation
will promote the traditional aims of punishment-retribution and
deterrence; (5) whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime;
(6) whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected
is assignable for it; and (7) whether it appears excessive in relation to the
148
alternative purpose assigned.

Legislative intent is entitled to judicial deference; “‘only the clearest proof’
will suffice to override legislative intent and transform what has been
denominated a civil remedy into a criminal penalty.” 149
The Exchange Act provides for a regulatory system of civil sanctions,
and FINRA consistently describes its sanctions as remedial. 150 Therefore,
FINRA sanctions are presumed to be civil remedies, yet a too-severe
sanction may be deemed punitive. The question remains: what is the
distinction between kicking someone out of the industry as punishment and
kicking someone out as a remedial sanction? A sanction imposed for the
purpose of punishing someone for past conduct, as retribution for a wrong
or just deserts, is unquestionably punitive in nature.151 Sanctions imposed to
compensate the government for a loss (restitution), 152 or disgorgement of
ill-gotten gains, 153 by contrast, are unquestionably remedial. Deterrence as a
rationale is less clear. Traditionally, sanctions imposed as deterrence were
generally viewed as punitive. 154 The modern view, however, is to
147. Id. at 99 (quoting Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148, 154 (1956)).
148. Hudson, 522 U.S. at 100 (quoting Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168–69
(1963)) (internal quotation marks omitted). In Mendoza-Martinez, the Court found that a statute
taking away U.S. citizenship for evading military service was punitive based on congressional
descriptions of the purpose of the statute. 372 U.S. at 186.
149. Hudson, 522 U.S. at 100 (quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 249 (1980)).
150. See infra notes 178–181.
151. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144. In ruling that a state statute requiring registration of
convicted sex offenders was non-punitive and therefore did not violate the ex post facto clause,
the Supreme Court acknowledged that public shaming as the motive for sanctions may raise
constitutional problems. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 102 (2003).
152. United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 334 (1998) (establishing a gross proportionality
test for determining if forfeiture would violate the excessive fines clause).
153. Sweeney, Exchange Act Release No. 29,884, 1991 WL 716756, at *5 (Oct. 30, 1991)
(stating that, generally, disgorgement should be ordered in all cases in which the SRO can identify
direct financial gain obtained as a result of wrongful activity, in order to remedy past wrongs and
deter future misconduct). Disgorgement amounts must be approximately equal to the unjust
enrichment or else they are unreasonable and excessive. Hateley v. SEC, 8 F.3d 653, 656 (9th Cir.
1993).
154. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 329. In Johnson v. SEC, 87 F.3d 484, 488 (D.C. Cir. 1996), the
court held that a “penalty,” as the term is used in the statute of limitations for government
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distinguish between general and specific deterrence. Specific deterrence is
recognized as remedial, serving to protect the public by removing the
person from the industry. 155 General deterrence is also recognized as an
appropriate factor to take into consideration, at least where the offense was
egregious. 156 General deterrence, however, is not appropriate without
specific deterrence; it is not permissible to make an example of someone
who does not otherwise warrant specific deterrence.157 Accordingly, a bar,
expulsion, or long-term suspension is considered remedial so long as there
are reasons as to why the sanction serves to protect the trading public from
future harm. 158
In reviewing SEC orders imposing sanctions, 159 courts recognize that
they should not ordinarily substitute their judgment for the agency’s as to
measures necessary to protect the public interest because “the relation of
remedy to policy is peculiarly a matter for administrative competence.”160
Nevertheless, courts do more than rubber-stamp the SEC order, and, at least
in instances of a bar or long-term suspension, courts will consider whether
the sanction is appropriately remedial and not punitive. 161 Steadman v.

sanctions, is a form of punishment that goes beyond remedying the damage caused by the harmful
conduct.
155. McCurdy v. SEC, 396 F.3d 1258, 1264–65 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (rejecting argument that a
one-year suspension against a certified public accountant was punitive because it was based on his
past reckless conduct, finding it “difficult to imagine how any suspension, remedial or not, could
be based on anything but past actions,” and making it clear that the purpose of the suspension was
to protect the public); Wright v. SEC, 112 F.2d 89, 94 (2d Cir. 1940) (rejecting argument that
proof beyond a reasonable doubt was required to expel member). A six-month disciplinary
suspension “would less resemble punishment if the SEC had focused on [the individual’s] current
competence or the degree of risk she posed to the public.” Johnson, 87 F.3d at 489.
156. Steadman v. SEC, 603 F.2d 1126, 1140 (5th Cir. 1979) (requiring SEC to articulate
compelling reasons for permanent expulsion, e.g., that violation is so egregious that it mandates
permanent expulsion as a deterrent to others); Busacca v. SEC, 449 Fed. App’x 886, 893 (11th
Cir. 2011) (rejecting argument that SEC’s acknowledged aim of encouraging other supervisors to
respond to operational problems was impermissibly punitive).
157. PAZ Sec., Inc. v. SEC, 494 F.3d 1059, 1066 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (quoting and agreeing with
Second Circuit’s statement on general deterrence); McCarthy v. SEC, 406 F.3d 179, 189 (2d Cir.
2005) (stating that general deterrence is not sufficient justification for expulsion or suspension,
although it may be considered as part of the overall remedial inquiry); Beck v. SEC, 430 F.2d 673,
674–75 (6th Cir. 1970) (holding that four-month suspension was punitive where it did not appear
that the broker would be inclined to commit any further misconduct).
158. Ricupero v. SEC, 436 Fed. App’x 31, 33 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting McCarthy, 406 F.3d at
188) (In reviewing an SEC order sustaining SRO sanctions, the foremost consideration is whether
it “protects the trading public from further harm.”).
159. Courts do not draw a distinction between SEC orders that originated within the SEC
(through an ALJ) or originated with an SRO, since an agency’s review of an SRO order is de novo
and it must make the requisite findings. See supra notes 39–41.
160. O’Leary v. SEC, 424 F.2d 908, 911 (D.C. Cir. 1970). The courts acknowledge that there is
considerable discretion in determining the appropriate sanction, recognizing only that “[p]erhaps
gross disparities in sanctions for similar behavior would at least suggest underlying bias.”
D’Alessio v. SEC, 380 F.3d 112, 125 (2d Cir. 2004) (emphasis added).
161. E.g., Steadman v. SEC, 603 F.2d 1126, 1141 (5th Cir. 1979).

2013]

Punishing Bad Brokers

45

SEC, 162 a frequently cited case, lists factors that essentially amount to a
prediction about whether the person is likely to engage in misconduct in the
future:
[1] the egregiousness of the defendant’s actions, [2] the isolated or
recurrent nature of the infraction, [3] the degree of scienter involved, [4]
the sincerity of the defendant’s assurances against future violations, [5] the
defendant’s recognition of the wrongful nature of his conduct, and [6] the
likelihood that the defendant’s occupation will present opportunities for
163
future violations.

Another frequently cited opinion, McCarthy v. SEC, 164 identified as
relevant factors: “[t]he seriousness of the offense, the corresponding harm
to the trading public, the potential gain to the broker for disobeying the
rules, the potential for repetition in light of the current regulatory and
enforcement regime, and the deterrent value to the offending broker and
others.” 165 Other courts state more generally that sanctions are punitive if
they are too severe or draconian. 166 What the courts require is that the SEC
considered the facts and circumstances of the particular case, made the
requisite findings of a violation, and articulated reasons why the sanction is
appropriate for the particular violation. Courts have criticized boilerplate
findings of wrongdoing 167 and do not find it sufficient if the agency merely
stated, in effect, that the conduct was illegal or that the individual in
question was a bad person. 168 Courts have vacated SEC orders for failing to
address mitigating factors advanced by the individual to reduce the
sanction. 169 Courts are especially concerned where the SEC has upheld a
permanent bar, since it amounts to termination of a professional career.170
Courts often identify lack of remorse by the violator and substantial
losses to investors, particularly unsophisticated customers, as important
factors in upholding bars. 171 Instances where a bar was upheld because of
findings of egregious conduct include:
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

Id. at 1140.
Id. (noting that these are the factors deemed relevant to the issuance of an injunction).
McCarthy v. SEC, 406 F.3d 179, 190 (2d Cir. 2005).
Id.
E.g., D’Alessio v. SEC, 380 F.3d 112, 124 (2d Cir. 2004).
McCarthy, 406 F.3d at 189 (finding it suggestive that the SEC did not devote individual
attention to the unique facts and circumstances of the case).
168. Id. at 188; Blinder, Robinson & Co. v. SEC, 837 F.2d 1099, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
169. Saad v. SEC, 718 F.3d 904, 914 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
170. Id. at 906 (quoting PAZ Sec., Inc. v. SEC, 494 F.3d 1059, 1065 (D.C. Cir. 2007))
(describing a lifetime bar as “‘the securities industry equivalent of capital punishment’”); see also
Blinder, 837 F.2d at 1113 (“Faced with a task of such gravity, the Commission must craft with
care.”). Courts have rejected, however, arguments that the SEC can impose a permanent bar only
if it makes findings explaining why a lesser sanction is not sufficient. Paz Sec., Inc. v. SEC, 566
F.3d 1172, 1176 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Rizek v. SEC, 215 F.3d 157, 161 (1st Cir. 2000).
171. Failure to express remorse may be more common in cases where the brokers are not
represented by counsel, as is frequently the case in disciplinary proceedings.
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Broker showed no remorse, customers were unsophisticated, and
losses were substantial; 172
Broker did not acknowledge wrong, blamed others (including
customer), and engaged in ongoing deception; 173 and
Broker engaged in a pattern of wrongdoing and harm to retail
customers.174

In contrast, examples of impermissible, “draconian” penalties include:
•
•
•

An uncertain regulatory environment; 175
Non-frivolous claim of “systemic pattern of disparate treatment”
against newer, smaller firms that resulted in “predictably,
disproportionately harsh sanctions;” 176 and
Individual has been engaged in the industry without further trouble
since the misconduct.177

B. THE PRACTICE OF FINRA’S SANCTIONS
In the preceding section, we looked at the theory and law of FINRA’s
sanctions as developed in the case law. In this section, we look at the
practice of FINRA’s sanctions.
First and foremost, FINRA articulates as a fundamental principle that
its sanctions are remedial.178 Thus, for example, statements by FINRA CEO
Richard G. Ketchum consistently emphasize that a strong enforcement
program is for the protection of investors and do not speak in terms of
punishing violators. 179 Similarly, a former NYSE regulator (prior to the
172. Rizek, 215 F.3d at 159–60 (churning in accounts of five customers).
173. Otto v. SEC, 253 F.3d 960, 962 (7th Cir. 2001) (misuse of a customer’s funds for his
personal use).
174. Gonchar v. SEC, 409 Fed. App’x 396, 399 (2d Cir. 2010) (excessive undisclosed markups
to retail customers).
175. Blinder, 837 F.2d at 1112 (antifraud and antimanipulation violations in underwriting penny
stock offerings); Arthur Lipper Corp. v. SEC, 547 F.2d 171, 175 (2d Cir. 1976) (payment of giveups); see also Upton v. SEC, 75 F.3d 92, 98 (2d Cir. 1996) (vacating an SEC order because of
insufficient notice that the SEC considered the firm’s practice a violation of its customer
protection rule).
176. Blinder, 837 F.2d at 1112.
177. McCarthy v. SEC, 406 F.3d 179, 189 (2d Cir. 2005) (floor trading violations); Beck v.
SEC, 430 F.2d 673, 674 (6th Cir. 1970) (misrepresentations to customers in connection with sales
of a security).
178. FINRA, SANCTION GUIDELINES 4 (2011) [hereinafter FINRA, SANCTION GUIDELINES],
available
at
http://www.finra.org/web/idcplg?IdcService=SS_GET_PAGE&ssDocName
=p011038.
179. See, e.g., News Release, FINRA, 2012: FINRA Year in Review (Jan. 8, 2013), available at
http://www.finra.org/Newsroom/NewsReleases/2013/P197624 (“Protecting investors and helping
to ensure the integrity of the nation’s financial markets is at the heart of what we do every day.”);
see also Letter from Richard G. Ketchum, Chairman & CEO, FINRA, in FINRA, FINRA 2010
YEAR IN REVIEW AND ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT 2–3 (2011), available at
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consolidation) stated that “[t]he Exchange does not frame its regulatory
proceedings in terms of punishment.” 180 FINRA’s Sanction Guidelines (the
Guidelines) also emphasize the remedial purpose of sanctions, as is
discussed shortly. 181
Second, it is important to keep in mind that very few of FINRA’s
sanctions are imposed after a disciplinary hearing; consequently, the
number of sanctions that are reviewed even by the NAC is small. This is
true even with respect to the most severe sanctions. A review of the
monthly FINRA disciplinary actions for 2008 showed a total of 274
disciplinary actions imposing bars, of which over two-thirds were settled. 182
Another twenty-five percent were default decisions. 183 Only in sixteen
reported disciplinary actions imposing a bar was a hearing conducted in
which respondents contested the charges, and in many of them respondents
appeared pro se. 184 There were another thirteen reported actions imposing a
two-year suspension, only two of which involved hearings where
respondents contested the charges.185 Of the eighteen reported decisions, the
highest ultimate adjudicator in each instance was as follows: one was a

http://www.finra.org/web/idcplg?IdcService=SS_GET_PAGE&ssDocName=P123836;
Letter
from Richard G. Ketchum, Chairman & CEO, FINRA (2010), available at
http://www.finra.org/web/idcplg?IdcService=SS_GET_PAGE&ssDocName=P121646.
180. Susan Merrill et al., Sharper and Brighter: Focusing on Sanctions at the New York Stock
Exchange, 3 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 155, 169 (2006).
181. See infra notes 198–205 and accompanying text; see also FINRA, SANCTION GUIDELINES,
supra note 178, at 4.
182. FINRA’s 2008 disciplinary actions are reported on its website. 2008 Monthly & Quarterly
Disciplinary Actions, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/Industry/Enforcement/DisciplinaryActions
/MonthlyActions/2008/ (last visited Nov. 17, 2013).
183. See id.
184. See id.
185. Four were concluded by Letters of Acceptance, Waiver, or Consent; seven were concluded
by Offers of Settlement.
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judicial decision,186 seven were SEC decisions, 187 four were NAC
decisions, 188 and six were hearing panel decisions.189
Failure to contest the charges or to retain legal representation is not
surprising since a firm is likely to terminate the employment of an
associated person who is charged with a serious violation, and that
individual is not likely to have a bright future in the industry unless he is a
very successful salesperson. A recent empirical study, however, shows that
respondents who proceed to a hearing frequently persuade the hearing panel
to impose lower sanctions than the staff offered in settlement. 190

186. Gonchar v. SEC, 409 Fed. App’x 396, 400–01 (2d Cir. 2010) (denying petition for review
of SEC order sustaining sanctions imposed by the NASD for petitioner’s violations of the
Exchange Act).
187. CMG Inst. Trading, LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 59,325, 2009 WL 223617, at *11
(Jan. 30, 2009) [hereinafter CMG Release] (sustaining findings of violations and sanctions);
Epstein, Exchange Act Release No. 59,328, 2009 WL 223611, at *21 (Jan. 30, 2009) [hereinafter
Epstein Release] (sustaining findings of violations and sanctions); Ortiz, Exchange Act Release
No. 58,416, 2008 WL 3891311, at *10 (Aug. 22, 2008) [hereinafter Ortiz Release] (sustaining
findings of violations and sanctions); Craig, Exchange Act Release No. 59,137, 2008 WL
5328784, at *8 (Dec. 22, 2008) [hereinafter Craig Release] (sustaining findings of violations and
sanctions); Pellegrino, Exchange Act Release 59,125, 2008 WL 5328765, at *18 (Dec. 19, 2008)
[hereinafter Pellegrino Release] (sustaining findings of violations and sanctions); Audifferen,
Exchange Act Release No. 58,230, 2008 WL 2876502, at *16 (July 25, 2008) [hereinafter
Audifferen Release] (sustaining findings of violations and sanctions); Fawcett, Exchange Act
Release No. 56,770, 2007 WL 3306105, at *8 (Nov. 8, 2007) [hereinafter Fawcett Release]
(sustaining findings of violations and sanctions).
188. Dep’t of Enforcement v. Zaragoza, Complaint No. E8A2002109804, 2008 WL 3915716,
(FINRA NAC Aug. 20, 2008) [hereinafter Zaragoza Complaint] (affirming findings and
sanctions); Dep’t of Enforcement v. Dunbar, Complaint No. C07050050, 2008 WL 2167905,
(FINRA NAC May 20, 2008) [hereinafter Dunbar Complaint] (affirming findings and modifying
sanctions); Dep’t of Enforcement v. Nicolas, Complaint No. CAF040052, 2008 WL 696458,
(FINRA NAC Mar. 12, 2008) [hereinafter Nicolas Complaint] (affirming in part findings and
affirming sanctions); Dep’t of Enforcement v. Paratore, Complaint No. 2005002570601, 2008 WL
696457, (FINRA NAC Mar. 7, 2008) [hereinafter Paratore Complaint] (modifying findings in part
and affirming sanctions).
189. Dep’t of Enforcement v. Hodge, Discip. Proceeding No. 2006003995001, 2008 FINRA
Discip. LEXIS 52 (FINRA OHO Oct. 1, 2008) [hereinafter Hodge Discip. Proceeding]; Dep’t of
Enforcement v. Varone, Discip. Proceeding No. 2006007101701, 2008 FINRA Discip. LEXIS 55
(FINRA OHO Aug. 20, 2008) [hereinafter Varone Discip. Proceeding]; Dep’t of Enforcement v.
Selewach, Discip. Proceeding No. 2006005005301, 2008 FINRA Discip. LEXIS 5 (FINRA OHO
Feb. 20, 2008) [hereinafter Selewach Discip. Proceeding]; Dep’t of Enforcement v. Hansen,
Discip. Proceeding No. 2005001085001, 2008 FINRA Discip. LEXIS 2 (FINRA OHO Jan. 10,
2008) [hereinafter Hansen Discip. Proceeding]; Dep’t of Enforcement v. Mattes, Discip.
Proceeding No. 2006005936701, 2007 FINRA Discip. LEXIS 9 (FINRA OHO Nov. 6, 2007)
[hereinafter Mattes Discip. Proceeding]; Dep’t of Enforcement v. Behany, Discip. Proceeding No.
E9B2003026301, 2007 NASD Discip. LEXIS 17 (NASD OHO Mar. 20, 2007) [hereinafter
Behany Discip. Proceeding].
190. Brian L. Rubin & Jae C. Yoon, Stepping into the Ring Against the SEC and FINRA:
Sometimes It Pays to Duke It Out Against the Regulators, 40 SEC. REG. L.J. 485 (2012). During
the time period, when FINRA staff sought an industry bar, “75% of [respondents] convinced a
Hearing Panel to impose a lesser sanction.” Id. at 489. FINRA respondents with a lawyer also
fared significantly better than pro se respondents; during the time period, pro se respondents were
uniformly unsuccessful. Id. at 494 n.16.
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Because few disciplinary sanctions are imposed after a formal hearing
and fewer still are subject to any level of appeal, there is only a small body
of NAC decisions analyzing the factors to take into account in determining
appropriate sanctions, hence the importance of FINRA’s Sanction
Guidelines, which the NAC developed for use by hearing panels and the
NAC to determine appropriate sanctions and to promote consistency and
uniformity. 191 Consistent with the “facts and circumstances” approach
generally followed, 192 the Guidelines do not prescribe fixed sanctions for
particular violations, but instead are intended “to provide direction for
Adjudicators in imposing sanctions consistently and fairly,” 193 and
adjudicators have discretion to impose sanctions that fall outside the
recommended ranges. 194 The Guidelines set forth aggravating and
mitigating factors for adjudicators to take into account and permit
adjudicators to consider other aggravating and mitigating factors as well. 195
The value of the Guidelines is that they focus the attention of the
adjudicators on relevant considerations, and to the extent the factors focus
on remediation, the Guidelines may act as a curb on the natural tendency to
punish wrongdoers. Courts have cited with approval the SEC’s references
to the Guidelines in its consideration of appropriate sanctions.196 Indeed, the
D.C. Circuit recently vacated an SEC order affirming a NASD permanent

191. FINRA, SANCTION GUIDELINES, supra note 178, at 1. NASD first published the Sanction
Guidelines in 1993, and they are regularly revised. March 2006 Revisions, supra note 12 (answer
to question 1). The NAC “possesses ultimate authority with respect to the Sanction Guidelines.”
Id.
192. FINRA, SANCTION GUIDELINES, supra note 178, at 1, 3, 4. FINRA, however, has
established a bar as the standard sanction for three violations: failure to respond to a FINRA
inquiry or investigation, conversion of a customer’s funds or securities, and cheating on
qualifications examinations. See infra notes 206, 208 and accompanying text.
193. FINRA, SANCTION GUIDELINES, supra note 178, at 1. By contrast, the Exchange Act
authorizes the SEC to impose a civil penalty if the agency finds that it is in the public interest and
that the person has committed a willful offense or failed reasonably to supervise another person.
15 U.S.C. § 78u-2(b) (2012). The statute then sets forth a three-tier structure for determining
monetary penalties in SEC administrative proceedings and federal district court proceedings
brought by the SEC. Id. § 78u(d)(3). The third tier provides for the maximum amount of penalties
and thus identifies the most serious types of offenses. To impose third-tier penalties, the
adjudicator must find that the violation involved at least reckless disregard of a regulatory
requirement and resulted in substantial losses, or created a significant risk of substantial losses, to
other persons or resulted in substantial pecuniary gain to the violator. Id. §§ 78u(d)(3)(B)(iii), 78u2(b)(3). If adopted by FINRA, these factors could provide more concrete guidance as to what
constitutes “egregious” conduct. The statute also sets forth a non-exclusive list of factors the SEC
may consider in deciding whether a penalty is in the public interest: whether the violation
involved fraud, deceit, manipulation, or deliberate or reckless disregard of regulatory
requirements; the harm to other persons resulting from the violation; the extent to which any
person was unjustly enriched, taking into account any restitution made to the injured persons;
whether the person is a recidivist; and the need to deter such person and other persons. Id. § 78u2(c).
194. FINRA, SANCTION GUIDELINES, supra note 178, at 1.
195. Id.
196. Stoiber v. SEC, 161 F.3d 745, 753 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
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bar because it failed to address all of the mitigating factors raised by the
associated person, including, in particular, a factor expressly identified in
the Guidelines as mitigating. 197
The Guidelines contain general principles that should be considered in
all cases as well as specific considerations for common violations (the
General Principles). Beginning with the First Principle, the Sanction
Guidelines convey a message that FINRA sanctions are “remedial”:
Disciplinary sanctions are remedial in nature and should be designed
to deter future misconduct and to improve overall business standards
in the securities industry. The overall purposes of FINRA’s disciplinary
process and FINRA’s responsibility in imposing sanctions are to
remediate misconduct by preventing the recurrence of misconduct,
improving overall standards in the industry, and protecting the investing
public. Toward this end, Adjudicators should design sanctions that are
significant enough to prevent and discourage future misconduct by a
respondent, to deter others from engaging in similar misconduct, and to
198
modify and improve business practices.

Similarly, other statements in the General Principles set forth purposes
that courts have recognized as appropriately remedial. 199 Thus, adjudicators
are encouraged to design sanctions to prevent the recurrence of
misconduct. 200 In order to remediate misconduct, adjudicators should order
restitution and/or rescission 201 and should take into account a respondent’s
ill-gotten gain in determining fines.202 Requiring a violator to requalify in
any or all capacities is an appropriate sanction when adjudicators have
found that his actions demonstrated a lack of knowledge or familiarity with
the rules of the securities industry. 203
The literature on sanctions recognizes that regulators may appropriately
impose sanctions to induce compliance with the rules and to deter
misconduct by raising the cost of violation above the cost of compliance. 204

197. Saad v. SEC, 718 F.3d 904, 913 (D.C. Cir. 2013); see also PAZ Sec., Inc. v. SEC, 494
F.3d 1059, 1065 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (stating that the SEC must carefully consider potentially
mitigating factors, especially when the associated person faces a lifetime bar).
198. FINRA, SANCTION GUIDELINES, supra note 178, at 2 (General Principle 1).
199. Id. at 4.
200. Id. at 3 (General Principle 3). Examples include requiring a consultant to design or
implement compliance procedures and requiring a firm to implement heightened supervision of
certain individuals or departments. Id.
201. Id. at 4 (General Principle 5). Adjudicators may order restitution when an identifiable
person “has suffered a quantifiable loss proximately caused by respondent’s misconduct.” Id.
Without causation, however, a restitution sanction is arbitrary and non-remedial. See Siegel v.
SEC, 592 F.3d 147, 161–62 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
202. FINRA, SANCTION GUIDELINES, supra note 178, at 5 (General Principle 6).
203. Id. at 5 (General Principle 7).
204. The classic economic analysis of this is Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An
Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968). For a recent discussion of its application to
securities offenses, see Samuel W. Buell, Liability and Admissions of Wrongdoing in Public
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Under this approach, an important factor for the regulator to take into
account in determining sanctions is the difficulty in detecting violations.205
This factor, however, is not mentioned as a consideration in the Sanction
Guidelines and is not discussed in the opinions, perhaps because FINRA
does not want to suggest that some violations are difficult to detect.
FINRA explains that, in determining if a violation is egregious,
adjudicators “assess the individual facts and circumstances of the case” and
“also consider all relevant aggravating and mitigating factors.” 206 FINRA
does not attempt to define “egregious,” but the dictionary definition of
“[e]xtremely or remarkably bad” provides a working definition consistent
with the Sanction Guidelines. 207 Thus, the Sanction Guidelines identify
factors that can lead to a finding of egregious conduct: repeated instances of
wrongful conduct; 208 the violator’s motives, e.g., bad faith 209 and intentional
misconduct; 210 significant injury to customers 211 and activity involving
numerous customers; 212 and failures to meet compliance requirements for
extended periods of time. 213 The Sanction Guidelines frequently refer to
factors that go to mens rea, scienter, and prior disciplinary history. 214 Thus,
the General Principles state that “sanctions should be more severe for
recidivists.” 215 Similarly, the Guidelines identify a number of factors that
may be mitigating or aggravating, as the case may be, 216 many of which
also go to mens rea, including repentance (especially prior to detection), 217
lack of remorse and concealment, 218 and intent/culpability. 219 Although the
emphasis on mens rea suggests an intention to punish, these factors can also
be described as remedial since they address the need to protect the general

Enforcement of Law, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2230396 (describing the deterrent effect of sanctions).
205. See Minzner, supra note 136, at 877–78 (citing the literature).
206. March 2006 Revisions, supra note 12 (answer to question 17). The website explains that
adjudicators have “wide discretion” in determining sanctions. Id. (answer to question 7).
207. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 593 (9th ed. 2009). In the case law under Rule 10b-5,
“egregious” conduct generally connotes at least reckless conduct. See, e.g., In re Livent, Inc.
Noteholders Sec. Litig., 151 F. Supp. 2d 371, 418–22 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (discussing pleading
standard under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act).
208. FINRA, SANCTION GUIDELINES, supra note 178, at 98 n.2 (categories of egregious
unauthorized trading); id. at 13 (outside activities including selling away); id. at 39 (failure to
register).
209. Id. at 98 n.2 (egregious unauthorized trading).
210. Id. at 41 (failure to comply with continuing education requirements).
211. Id. at 13 (outside activities including selling away).
212. Id. at 82 (failure to comply with risk disclosure requirements for day trading accounts).
213. Id. at 64 (failure to comply with TRACE reporting requirements).
214. See id. at 4–6.
215. Id. at 2.
216. Id. at 6–7.
217. Id. at 2–4.
218. See id. at 6.
219. See id. at 4, 7.
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investing public from an individual who has shown himself to be a “bad
apple.”
By contrast, the Exchange Act provides somewhat more guidance for
the imposition of civil penalties in SEC actions. The statute authorizes the
SEC to impose a civil penalty if the agency finds that it is in the public
interest and that the person has committed a willful offense or failed
reasonably to supervise another person. 220 The statute then sets forth a
three-tier structure for determining monetary penalties in SEC
administrative proceedings 221 and in federal district court proceedings
brought by the SEC. 222 The third tier provides for the maximum amount of
penalties and thus identifies the most serious types of offenses. To impose
third-tier penalties, the adjudicator must find that the violation involved at
least reckless disregard of a regulatory requirement and resulted in
substantial losses, or created a significant risk of substantial losses, to other
persons or resulted in substantial pecuniary gain to the violator. 223 If
adopted by FINRA, these factors could provide more concrete guidance as
to what constitutes “egregious” conduct. The statute also sets forth a nonexclusive list of factors the SEC may consider in deciding whether a
penalty is in the public interest: whether the violation involved fraud,
deceit, manipulation, or deliberate or reckless disregard of regulatory
requirements; the harm to other persons resulting from the violation; the
extent to which any person was unjustly enriched, taking into account any
restitution made to the injured persons; whether the person is a recidivist;
and the need to deter such person and other persons. 224 These factors are
similar to those identified in the Sanction Guidelines.
Two other factors set forth in the Sanction Guidelines are also worthy
of mention. Firm size and the ability to pay are considerations that do not
seem relevant in assessing whether sanctions are appropriately remedial.
Congress, however, identified the violator’s ability to pay a civil penalty as
an important consideration when in 1990 it authorized, for the first time, the
SEC to impose monetary penalties, 225 and the Small Business Regulatory
Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996 requires federal agencies to establish a
policy to provide for the reduction or waiver of civil penalties for small
entities. 226 In 1996, the SEC vacated a NASD restitution order because its
refusal to consider evidence of financial inability to pay was unduly
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.

15 U.S.C. § 78u-2(b) (2012).
Id.
Id. § 78u(d)(3).
Id. §§ 78u(d)(3)(B)(iii), 78u-2(b)(3).
Id. § 78u-2(c).
Id. § 78u-2(d); see also Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of
1990, Pub. L. No. 101-429, 104. Stat. 931; SECURITIES LAW ENFORCEMENT REMEDIES ACT OF
1990, H.R. REP. NO. 101-616, at 21 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1379, 1388.
226. Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-121, § 223, 110
Stat. 857, 862.
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harsh. 227 As a result of these directives from Congress and the SEC, the
Guidelines instruct adjudicators to consider firm size to ensure that the
sanctions are “not punitive but are sufficiently remedial to achieve
deterrence.” 228 The Guidelines also explicitly state that the SEC requires
adjudicators to consider ability to pay in connection with the imposition,
reduction, or waiver of a fine or restitution when the respondent raises the
issue. 229 The Guidelines, while stating generally that adjudicators should
consider firm size, also draw a distinction between sanctions imposed for
violations based on negligent conduct and those based on fraudulent,
willful, or reckless conduct. In the latter instances, adjudicators are
permitted not to take into account firm size. 230
A second important factor that does relate to a remedial purpose is
compliance. The Guidelines emphasize the importance of compliance.
Thus, adjudicators may appropriately consider:
•
•
•
•

“Whether, at the time of the violation, the . . . firm had developed
reasonable supervisory, operational and/or technical procedures or
controls that were properly implemented;” 231
“Whether, at the time of the violation, the firm had developed
adequate training and educational initiatives;” 232
“Whether the respondent demonstrated reasonable reliance on
competent legal or accounting advice;”233 and
Whether the firm can demonstrate that the conduct was “not
otherwise reflective of the firm’s historical compliance record.” 234

Because regulatory standards require compliance systems for investor
protection and because compliance systems are expensive, these factors
identify important remedial purposes.
Finally, despite FINRA’s emphasis on the facts and circumstances of
the inquiry, there are three violations where a bar is standard. These are:
•

Individuals who fail to respond in any manner to FINRA inquiry or
investigation. 235 Because FINRA does not have subpoena power,
this is a violation of the fundamental nature of self-regulation; lack

227. Reed, Exchange Act Release No. 37,572, 1996 WL 466575, at *2 (Aug. 14, 1996).
228. FINRA, SANCTION GUIDELINES, supra note 178, at 2. General Principle 8 requires
adjudicators to consider ability to pay when raised by a respondent. Id. at 5.
229. Id. at 5.
230. Id. at 2 n.2.
231. Id. at 6.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 7.
235. See id. at 33. Where mitigation exists, suspension in any or all capacities for up to two
years is suggested.
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of harm to customers or benefit to the violator does not mitigate this
violation. 236
Conversion of a customer’s funds or securities, regardless of
amount converted. 237 More than any other violation, this offense
damages the public’s confidence in the broker-dealer relationship.
Cheating on qualifications exams. 238 An individual who gained
entry through cheating should not be allowed to continue in the
industry.

As described earlier, a review of the FINRA 2008 Monthly and
Quarterly Disciplinary Actions found eighteen decisions where a bar or a
two-year suspension was imposed. 239 Many of the violations that resulted
in a bar were those for which a bar is standard. Thus, five of eighteen
decisions imposed a bar on an individual for failure to respond to a FINRA
inquiry or investigation; 240 another three imposed a bar for conversion of
customers’ funds. 241 Bars or a two-year suspension were also imposed for
other forms of simple fraud or obvious wrongdoing, such as failure to
disclose one’s criminal record on the Form U-4, 242 forgery, 243 misuse of
customer’s funds, 244 excessive trading in a customer’s account, 245 trading
ahead of a customer, 246 or interpositioning. 247 Many decisions note as
aggravating factors the willful or intentional nature of the conduct, 248 the
failure to acknowledge responsibility for wrongdoing, 249 substantial harm to
customers, 250 and taking advantage of vulnerable customers. 251 Youth and
inexperience were not accepted as mitigating factors.252 Dishonest conduct
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.

Id. at 2 n.2.
Id. at 36.
Id. at 40.
See supra notes 187–189 and accompanying text.
Ortiz Release, supra note 187; Fawcett Release, supra note 187; Hodge Discip.
Proceeding, supra note 189; Varone Discip. Proceeding, supra note 189; Hansen Discip.
Proceeding, supra note 189. In one administrative proceeding, a NASD member firm and its CEO
received two-year suspensions for failure to respond in a timely fashion. CMG Release, supra
note 187.
241. Paratore Complaint, supra note 188; Selewach Discip. Proceeding, supra note 189; Mattes
Discip. Proceeding, supra note 189.
242. Craig Release, supra note 187.
243. Ortiz Release, supra note 187.
244. Varone Discip. Proceeding, supra note 189.
245. Zaragoza Complaint, supra note 188.
246. Nicolas Complaint, supra note 188.
247. Gonchar v. SEC, 409 Fed. App’x 396, 399 (2d Cir. 2010).
248. Ortiz Release, supra note 187; Audifferen Release, supra note 187.
249. Ortiz Release, supra note 187, at *8; Audiffern Release, supra note 187, at *14. In one
decision two brokers received two-year suspensions because they accepted responsibility, while
another was barred for failure to do so. Behany Discip. Proceeding, supra note 189.
250. Nicolas Complaint, supra note 188.
251. Zaragoza Complaint, supra note 188; Mattes Discip. Proceeding, supra note 189.
252. Epstein Release, supra note 187, at *21.
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was not excused because it was done for the purpose of benefitting the
customer. 253
CONCLUSION
Part I documents the transformation of the securities SRO from a
membership organization with contractual powers to require its members to
adhere to aspirational standards to a professional regulator that derives its
powers from the Exchange Act. Part II explores the tenuous distinction
between remedial and punitive sanctions and describes FINRA’s current
system for disciplining its members and associated persons. This is a
system that, to date, has operated largely under the radar without much
academic scrutiny.

253. Behany Discip. Proceeding, supra note 189 (improperly obtaining CDSC waivers for
customers; two brokers who accepted responsibility received two-year suspensions).

